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FEAR OF NUCLF.AR WARAND
INTERCOUNTR?DIFFERENCES IN THE RATE OF SAVING
ANIM
This paper demonstrates that a survey—based measure of the perceived
likelihood of nuclear war in a country is negatively correlated with the
country's rate of net private saving, holding other determinants of saving
constant. This result is established using date on twenty OCCO countries for
the period 1981—4. The measure of the perceived likelihood of nuclear war is
celculeted from surveys conducted in each country by the Gallup Internetional
Research Institutes. The magnitude of the estimated' effect Is large,
suggesting that en Increase of 10 percent in the fraction of the population
that believes a world war is likely is associated with a decline of 4.1
'percentage points in the net private saving rate,
This finding is consistent with other evidence based on U.S. aggregate
time series end cross-individual data suggesting that fear of nuclear war
decreases savings. That proposition has profound implications for the
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1. introduction
Thin paper investigates the hypothesis that an increased fear of a cata-
strophic nuclear war, by reducing the expected horizon, reduces the rate of
saving. This hypothesis, first proposed in Slearnd (1982). ia consistent with
U.S. postwar saving behavior. Holding other determinants of saving constant1
two separata indicee of fear nf nuclear war have a statistically significant
negative correlation with the U.S. net private saving rste since 1948 (Sleisrod,
1986). Nendershott and Peek (1985, 1987), using several alternative definition,
of saving and investigating other influencas on saving, also find that increased
fear has tended to reduce ssiing in the postwar U.S. econoey. Ruaaett and
Lsckay (1985) find no consistent relationship between savings and fear of war
at the aggregate level for several advanced countries. However, using individ—
nal data from the U.S. National Election Survey, they find that, for individ—
usia who did some saving, actual saving is negatively related to fear of nu-
clear. war to a statistically significant extent. Xuasett and Lackey conclude
that the moat appropriate data set is consiatent with the hypothesis that fsar
of nuclearwar reducessaving.1
Candifferencesin the percsived likelihood of nuclear war also explain
intercountry differences in saving behavior! The analysis preaented in this
paper,based on'srecentintarnatiànsi survey of attitudes concerning the like-
lihood ofworldwar,auggests that the answsr to this question is yes. Holding
'Stewartand Venieris (1985) find empirical support for a related hypothssis.
that sociopolitical instability reduces the saving rate of developing
countries.other deterrainanta of saving constant, a country's saving rate is lower the
greater is the fractinn of its population that believes a world war ia imminent.
2, Data and Results
in recent years the Gallup Internattonal Research Institutes has annually
conducted a pollinas many ae thirty—three countries concerning attttudee
aboutthelikelihood of world war.2 The poll in each country asks a random
sample of individuals to assess on a 0 to 10 scale the likelihood of a world
war breaking nut in the next ten years.3
Table1ranks the countries surveyed in 1986 according to the fraction of
respondents who felt that the chance of world war wee 50 percent of greater
within the next ten years. Moatstriking to a student of saving behavior is
thatthe U.S. stands at the top of the list, with49percent of the respondents
indicating at least a50—SOchance of a world war occurring within ten years.
Also of special interest is that Japan, which has had exceptionally high eaving
rates, is nest the bottom of the list with only 15 percent of those interviewed
professing to a high fear of world war.
2At lesst for Americans, the interpretation of the term world war as a cata-
strophic nuclear exchange is not in doubt. According to eurvey evidence,
throughout the postwar period over 60 percent of Americana believed that a
world war would involve nuclear weapons, and as many ea 60 percent viewed
their chances of surviving such a nuclear exchange as poor. See Slemrod
(1996). The interpretation of the term world war may,however,vary by
country, especially considering the difficulty of precise tranelstion into
other languages. To the extent that the interpretation vsries across coun-
tries, the survey results measure with error the perception of a war of con-
stant magnitude.
3The precise wordingofthe question was: I'd like your opinion ofthe
chancesof a world war breaking out in the nert 10 years. If 10 means it is
absolutely certain that aworldwmr will break out and zero means that there
is no chance of a world war breaking out, where onthisscale 0f 10 to zero
would you rate the chances of worldwar breaking nut in the next ten yearaV'—3—
Table 1
Fraction of Respondents Saying in 1986 that the Chance of World War
Within Ten Years is 50 Percent or Greeter, by Country
UnitedStates 49 Italy 22
South Africa (btacks) 49 Spein 22
Ecuador 45 Norway 21
Chile 43 Austria 20
Colombia 42 Great Brlrian 20
Australia 38 South Korea 19
Uruguay 38 Denmark 18
Brazil 34 Greece lB
Canada 34 tawenbourg 18
South Africa (whites) 33 Switzerland 18
India 32 West Germany 18
Argentina 30 Finland 17
Philtpptoes 27 Hong Kong 17
Ireland 25 Japan 15
Portugal 25 Sweden 15
Belgium 24 Turkey 15
France 24 Netherlands 14
Source:The Gallup Poll, released January 11, 1987.The analysis that folLows compares the survey responses concerning the
likelihood of a world war to average saving rates in twenty of the thirty—three
countries listed in Table 1 nver the period 1991 to 1984. These twenty are the
DECO (Organization of Rconneiic Cooperation and Development) member countries
both covered by the Gallup survey and tor which deta on net private savings are
available.4 The sample was restricted to 080 member countries becauae stan-
dardized and relatively reliable national income data are available, and he—
cause of the difficulty in comparing the characteristics of countries in radi-
cally different stages of development. The sample period of 1981 to 1984 was
chosen because it is the umost recent period for which both saving and survey
data are available. tt is appropriate to consider data averaged over several
years because it minimizes the importance of cyclical factors irrelevant to the
hypothesis being studied.
Table 2 presents the average net private aeving tate end the Index of the
perceived likelihood of world warover the period 1981 to 1984 for these twenty
countries,5 and Figure 1 graphs these date. The points corresponding to the
six largest countries in the sample are highlighted. The data for these six
countries, in particular, seem to indicate a negative association between the
net private caving rate snd the index of fear of war.
This apparent association is confirmed in a weighted least—squares regres-
sion explaining the average net private saving rate expressed as a percentage,
OECO member countries New Zealand, Portugal, Turkey, and Yugoslavia were omit-
ted because of the unavailability of data on net private savings. tceland was
not included in the Gallup survey.
5rable 2 and all subsequent regression results define the index of likelihood
of war to be the fraction of respondents who regiatered an opinion that said
that the chance of war was 50—50 or greater. All the regresaione were also
run with en altsnattve index, the average percentage chance of war indiceted
by those who registered an opinion. None of the conclueiona discussed In the
text depend on which index ia chosen.TabLe 2
Average NetPrivateSaving Rate and the Index of Perceived
Likelihood of Nuclear 4er for TwentyOECDCountries, 1981—1984
Index of Perceived



















United Kingdom 11.4 31.7
United States 9.6 54.5
*Complete data for 1984 wasunavailablefor Ireland, Luxembourg, and the
United States, and was available for 1983 for Luxembourg and Spein. Averagea
for these countries nrc computed over a aubaat of Lbs four years.
*droata for 1981 ia unavailable for Finland and Norway, and is unavailable for
1982 and 1984 for Austria. The 1981—1984 averages for these countries are
calculated using extrapolated figures baaedonoverall annual trends.










































































































































































































 S/Y, with a constant and the index of the likelihood of war, denoted WAR. The





where standard errors are in parentheees below the estimated coefficients, and
the value of is based on the weighted residuals.
As Figure 1 suggests, there is a statistically significant negative corre-
lation between the net private saving rate and the likelihood of war index.
The regression line corresponding to equation CL) is shown in Figure 1. The
magnitode of the estimated coefficient indicates that a decline of ten points
in the likelihood of war index would increase the net private saving rate by
ebout two and e half perceotsge pointe.
The analysis is next expended to include other determinants of a country's
sawing rate. Several studies of intercoontry differences in saving behavior
exist, ist notmbly Hnuthakkar (1961. 1965), Modigliani (1910), Feldetein
(1977, 1980), Sarro and MacDonald (1979), Kapits and Gotur (1980). Modigliani
and Sterling (1983), and Hnrioks (1986). 9esed on the life—cycle model of sav-
ing, they have examined the effect on eaving of both demographic factors and
government policies such ma the social security program. These studies differ
-6Thieprocedurris appropriate if the variance of the error term ie propor-
tional to the reciprocal of population, which would occur if tech country's
saving rate represented an average of independent units, with e homngenous
variance at the unit level. Barro end MacDonald (1979) found that the error
variance does decline with population, although not quite as rapidly as thte
weighting scheme implies. The aeneitivity of the resutte to the weighting
scheme is reported below.—B-
in variable definitions, datasources,the sample of countries, time period,
and specification, and the results are not entirety consistent across studies.
As a basis fur studying the effect on saving of fear of nuclear war, 1
study an undated version of the savings function estimated by Feldetein (1980),
which is representative of the other studies' methodology. I then investigate
the effect of introducing into the equation the index of the perceived Likeli-
hood of wsr. Fsldstein estimsted the following equation on a sample of 12 QEGO
countries, using data from the 1950's:
(2) + + AZAGEt+
B3DEP
+ + BSLPAGEDt+
whereC is the growth rate of total real private national income, AGE is the
ratio of the number of retirees aged 65 or over to the population aged 20 to -
65,DEF is the ratio of the number of persons under 20 to the working age popu-
lation, B/S is the benefit replacement ratio of the social security progran,
end LPACED is the labor force participation rate of men 65 or order. Three
principal changes were made to Feldstein'e analysis. First, the data are up-
dated to reflect more recent conditions. Second, due to data conetrsints, the
measure of the generosity of social security is the ratio of public pension
benefits pet person over 65 to per capita private national income (denoted
SOCSEC), instead of the benefit replacement ratio. Finally, the sample of
countries studied is expanded from twelve to twenty.7
The results of estimating this saving equation with and without WAR as en
explanatory variable are displayed in Table 3. The second column of Table 3
shows that, without WAR, the explanatory variables are not very successful in
7dnother methodologicsl difference is that Feldstein used two—stage least—
equares to account for the endogeneity of LPACED. The results, though, are
not significantly different fron those obtained with OLS. Finally, Feldstetn
weighted the observations by the country's population, rather then the square
root of population.Table 3
Weighted Ordinary least—Squares Regressions
Explaining the NetPrivateSaving Rate(SlY)
With and Without a Measure of Fear ofWar
















Standard error terma in parentheses.
Observations are weighted by the square root of the country's population in
1980.
Definition of variablea*:
5/?: Average net private saving rate, 1981—1984.
WAR: Index of perceived likelihood of world war, 1981—1984.
G: Growth in real private income per capita. 1976—1984.
AGE: Ratio of population aged 65 or over to population aged 20—64,
1980.
DEP: Ratio of population 19 or under to population aged20—64, 1980.
SOCSEC:Public pension benefits per person over 65 as a ratio of per
capita private national incotae, 1980.
LPAGED: Labor—force participation rate of males aged 65 or over1 1975.
*4 detailed data appendix specifying definitions and sources is available fron
the author.—10—
explaining intercountry differences in net private saving rates, The rate of
income growth. C, is negatively associated with saving, in contrast to most
previous studtes, although its estimated coefficient is not significantly
different than cern. Neither of the estimated coefficients on the variables
reflecting the age structure of the pnpulation, ACE and DEP. are significantly
different than zero. Hoet previous studies found both to be negatively asso-
ciated with the saving rate. The estimated coefficient on the social security
variable, SOCSEC, is close in zero. This finding is at odds with the negative
coefficient found by Feldstein (197?, 1980), although neither Bsrro and
MacDonald (1979) nor Modiglieni sod Sterling (1983) corroborated this tesolt.
The estimated coefficient on LPAGED is positive (though not significsnt), fail-
ing to support the prediction of f he life—cycle theory and in contrast with
earlier empirical results. tn sum, while Feldsteio (1960) foold all five coef—
fictents to be statistically significant and consistent with the qualitative
predictions of the extended life cycle model, these same conclusions do not
follow from this updated and slightly revised version of the eaae model.8
When WAR is included in the regression eqoatlon, its estimated coefficient
Ia negative snd statistically significant, and is therefore consistent with the
81t is difficult to pinpoint why the results reported in table 3 differ eo
greatly froa the resolts reported in peldetein (1960). Merely updating the
saving rates used by Feldatein does not substantially change the results, nor
does the difference in the weighting scheme. However, updating C, ACE, and
DEP, or changing 6/Etoen updated SOCSEC does change the results markedly.
Furthermore, the results reported In table 3 change drastically when the
sample is restricted to the same twelve countries studied by Feldetein. Thus,
any of a number of changes in the analysis is sufficient to cause the results
to differ significantly. It is Interesting to note that, in en appendix to
Feldatein (1960). Charles Horioka concluded that the difference between the
findings of Bairn and MacDonald (1979) and Feldstein (1977) concerning the
effect on saving of social aecurity was caused In part bf differences in
specification, sample of countries, variable definitions, data sources, and
time period.—11—
hypothesis that increased fear of war reduces a country's rate of saving. The
magnitude of the estimated effect is large1 indicating that an increase of 10
percent in the fraction of the population that believes a world war is likely
is associated with a decLine of 4. L percentage potnts in ths net private saving
rate. lncludtng thia variable also changes the sign of the estimated coeffi-
cients on LPAGED, fron positive to the negative coefficient found by Feldeiein
and others. With WAR included, all of the estimated coefficienta except that
of 0 have the same sign as estimated by Feldstein, although nnly the coefficient
on ACE is significantly different than zero at the 9Sf level of confidence.
Several variations of the baaic eatimation strategy were investigated to
test the robuatneee of the finding with reapect to changes in specification.
Weighting the obeervations by population, aa done by Feldatein ([977. 1980) and
Rorioka (1986), rather than the square root of population, increased the abso-
lute magnitude of the coefficient on WAR to 0.44 and substantially decreased
its standard error. The signs of the other estimated coefficients did not
change, but coefficienta except that on C became mare than one and a half times
their standard errora.9 Estimating the equation with unweighted ordinary
leaat—aguaree does weaken the qualitative conclusions. The estimated coeff i—
cient on the WAR variable becomea —0.219 with a atandatd error of 0.200. The
negative relationship between SI Y and WAR also survives the addition of the
several other potential influences on saving. One of special interest is the
level of real national income which, in the abaence of the WAR variable, has a
significant negAtive association with the saving rate. When WAR is iocluded,
thta association disappears and WAR tetaina a significant negative aasociation.
9Changiog to weighting by population does not, though, reacue the equation
without the WAR variable, which still has no estimated coefficient aignifi—
cantly different than zero and of the sign found by Faldstein.—12—
including as an explaoatnry variable the fraction of grossnattonalproduct
devoted to military spending did not affect the sam result, end it attracted a
negative sign not significantly different then zero. Finally, the analysis
was repeated excluding the U.S. from the sample. The estimated coefficient on
WAR was not much changed (—0.430). although the standard error increased to
0.097. The negative coefficient remained significantly different from zero.
3. Conclusion
This paper establishes than an index of the perceived likelihood of nuclear
war in a country ma negatively correlated with the country's rate of net pri-
vate saving, holding other deterisioanta of saving constant. This finding is
thus consistent with other evidence based on 11.5. aggregate time series and
cross—individual data suggesting that feet of nuclear war decreases saving.
That proposition has profound implicationa for ourinterpretationof the per-
formance of the poet—nuclear world economy, and thus deserves further attentton
and etudy by economists.—13—
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